INTRODUCTION

In which we try to explain why we consider artificial intelligence to be a subject most worthy of study, and in which we try to decide what exactly it is, this being a good thing to decide before embarking.

We call ourselves *Homo sapiens*—man the wise—because our mental capacities are so important to us. For thousands of years, we have tried to understand *how we think*; that is, how a mere handful of stuff can perceive, understand, predict, and manipulate a world far larger and more complicated than itself. The field of *artificial intelligence*, or AI, goes further still: it attempts not just to understand but also to *build* intelligent entities.

AI is one of the newest sciences. Work started in earnest soon after World War II, and the name itself was coined in 1956. Along with molecular biology, AI is regularly cited as the “field I would most like to be in” by scientists in other disciplines. A student in physics might reasonably feel that all the good ideas have already been taken by Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and the rest. AI, on the other hand, still has openings for several full-time Einsteins.

AI currently encompasses a huge variety of subfields, ranging from general-purpose areas, such as learning and perception to such specific tasks as playing chess, proving mathematical theorems, writing poetry, and diagnosing diseases. AI systematizes and automates intellectual tasks and is therefore potentially relevant to any sphere of human intellectual activity. In this sense, it is truly a universal field.

1.1 WHAT IS AI?

We have claimed that AI is exciting, but we have not said what it *is*. Definitions of artificial intelligence according to eight textbooks are shown in Figure 1.1. These definitions vary along two main dimensions. Roughly, the ones on top are concerned with *thought processes* and *reasoning*, whereas the ones on the bottom address *behavior*. The definitions on the left measure success in terms of fidelity to human performance, whereas the ones on the right measure against an ideal concept of intelligence, which we will call *rationality*. A system is rational if it does the “right thing,” given what it knows.
Chapter 1. Introduction

Systems that think like humans

“The exciting new effort to make computers think . . . machines with minds, in the full and literal sense.” (Haugeland, 1985)

 “[The automation of] activities that we associate with human thinking, activities such as decision-making, problem solving, learning . . .” (Bellman, 1978)

Systems that act like humans

“The art of creating machines that perform functions that require intelligence when performed by people.” (Kurzweil, 1990)

“The study of how to make computers do things at which, at the moment, people are better.” (Rich and Knight, 1991)

Historically, all four approaches to AI have been followed. As one might expect, a tension exists between approaches centered around humans and approaches centered around rationality.\(^1\) A human-centered approach must be an empirical science, involving hypothesis and experimental confirmation. A rationalist approach involves a combination of mathematics and engineering. Each group has both disparaged and helped the other. Let us look at the four approaches in more detail.

### Acting humanly: The Turing Test approach

The Turing Test, proposed by Alan Turing (1950), was designed to provide a satisfactory operational definition of intelligence. Rather than proposing a long and perhaps controversial list of qualifications required for intelligence, he suggested a test based on indistinguishability from undeniably intelligent entities—human beings. The computer passes the test if a human interrogator, after posing some written questions, cannot tell whether the written responses come from a person or not. Chapter 26 discusses the details of the test and whether a computer is really intelligent if it passes. For now, we note that programming a computer to pass the test provides plenty to work on. The computer would need to possess the following capabilities:

- \(\textbf{natural language processing}\) to enable it to communicate successfully in English.

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\(^1\) We should point out that, by distinguishing between human and rational behavior, we are not suggesting that humans are necessarily “irrational” in the sense of “emotionally unstable” or “insane.” One merely need note that we are not perfect: we are not all chess grandmasters, even those of us who know all the rules of chess; and, unfortunately, not everyone gets an A on the exam. Some systematic errors in human reasoning are cataloged by Kahneman \textit{et al.} (1982).
knowledge representation to store what it knows or hears;
automated reasoning to use the stored information to answer questions and to draw new conclusions;
machine learning to adapt to new circumstances and to detect and extrapolate patterns.

Turing’s test deliberately avoided direct physical interaction between the interrogator and the computer, because physical simulation of a person is unnecessary for intelligence. However, the so-called total Turing Test includes a video signal so that the interrogator can test the subject’s perceptual abilities, as well as the opportunity for the interrogator to pass physical objects “through the hatch.” To pass the total Turing Test, the computer will need

- computer vision to perceive objects, and
- robotics to manipulate objects and move about.

These six disciplines compose most of AI, and Turing deserves credit for designing a test that remains relevant 50 years later. Yet AI researchers have devoted little effort to passing the Turing test, believing that it is more important to study the underlying principles of intelligence than to duplicate an exemplar. The quest for “artificial flight” succeeded when the Wright brothers and others stopped imitating birds and learned about aerodynamics. Aeronautical engineering texts do not define the goal of their field as making “machines that fly so exactly like pigeons that they can fool even other pigeons.”

**Thinking humanly: The cognitive modeling approach**

If we are going to say that a given program thinks like a human, we must have some way of determining how humans think. We need to get inside the actual workings of human minds. There are two ways to do this: through introspection—trying to catch our own thoughts as they go by—and through psychological experiments. Once we have a sufficiently precise theory of the mind, it becomes possible to express the theory as a computer program. If the program’s input/output and timing behaviors match corresponding human behaviors, that is evidence that some of the program’s mechanisms could also be operating in humans. For example, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, who developed GPS, the “General Problem Solver” (Newell and Simon, 1961), were not content to have their program solve problems correctly. They were more concerned with comparing the trace of its reasoning steps to traces of human subjects solving the same problems. The interdisciplinary field of cognitive science brings together computer models from AI and experimental techniques from psychology to try to construct precise and testable theories of the workings of the human mind.

Cognitive science is a fascinating field, worthy of an encyclopedia in itself (Wilson and Keil, 1999). We will not attempt to describe what is known of human cognition in this book. We will occasionally comment on similarities or differences between AI techniques and human cognition. Real cognitive science, however, is necessarily based on experimental investigation of actual humans or animals, and we assume that the reader has access only to a computer for experimentation.

In the early days of AI there was often confusion between the approaches: an author would argue that an algorithm performs well on a task and that it is therefore a good model
of human performance, or vice versa. Modern authors separate the two kinds of claims; this distinction has allowed both AI and cognitive science to develop more rapidly. The two fields continue to fertilize each other, especially in the areas of vision and natural language. Vision in particular has recently made advances via an integrated approach that considers neurophysiological evidence and computational models.

**Thinking rationally: The “laws of thought” approach**

The Greek philosopher Aristotle was one of the first to attempt to codify “right thinking,” that is, irrefutable reasoning processes. His *syllogisms* provided patterns for argument structures that always yielded correct conclusions when given correct premises—for example, “Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; therefore, Socrates is mortal.” These laws of thought were supposed to govern the operation of the mind; their study initiated the field called *logic*.

Logicians in the 19th century developed a precise notation for statements about all kinds of things in the world and about the relations among them. (Contrast this with ordinary arithmetic notation, which provides mainly for equality and inequality statements about numbers.) By 1965, programs existed that could, in principle, solve *any* solvable problem described in logical notation. The so-called *logicist* tradition within artificial intelligence hopes to build on such programs to create intelligent systems.

There are two main obstacles to this approach. First, it is not easy to take informal knowledge and state it in the formal terms required by logical notation, particularly when the knowledge is less than 100% certain. Second, there is a big difference between being able to solve a problem “in principle” and doing so in practice. Even problems with just a few dozen facts can exhaust the computational resources of any computer unless it has some guidance as to which reasoning steps to try first. Although both of these obstacles apply to *any* attempt to build computational reasoning systems, they appeared first in the logicist tradition.

**Acting rationally: The rational agent approach**

An *agent* is just something that acts (*agent* comes from the Latin *agere*, to do). But computer agents are expected to have other attributes that distinguish them from mere “programs,” such as operating under autonomous control, perceiving their environment, persisting over a prolonged time period, adapting to change, and being capable of taking on another’s goals. A *rational agent* is one that acts so as to achieve the best outcome or, when there is uncertainty, the best expected outcome.

In the “laws of thought” approach to AI, the emphasis was on correct inferences. Making correct inferences is sometimes *part* of being a rational agent, because one way to act rationally is to reason logically to the conclusion that a given action will achieve one’s goals and then to act on that conclusion. On the other hand, correct inference is not *all* of rationality, because there are often situations where there is no provably correct thing to do, yet something must still be done. There are also ways of acting rationally that cannot be said to involve inference. For example, recoiling from a hot stove is a reflex action that is usually more successful than a slower action taken after careful deliberation.

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2 If there is no solution, the program might never stop looking for one.
All the skills needed for the Turing Test are there to allow rational actions. Thus, we need the ability to represent knowledge and reason with it because this enables us to reach good decisions in a wide variety of situations. We need to be able to generate comprehensible sentences in natural language because saying those sentences helps us get by in a complex society. We need learning not just for erudition, but because having a better idea of how the world works enables us to generate more effective strategies for dealing with it. We need visual perception not just because seeing is fun, but to get a better idea of what an action might achieve—for example, being able to see a tasty morsel helps one to move toward it.

For these reasons, the study of AI as rational-agent design has at least two advantages. First, it is more general than the “laws of thought” approach, because correct inference is just one of several possible mechanisms for achieving rationality. Second, it is more amenable to scientific development than are approaches based on human behavior or human thought because the standard of rationality is clearly defined and completely general. Human behavior, on the other hand, is well-adapted for one specific environment and is the product, in part, of a complicated and largely unknown evolutionary process that still is far from producing perfection. This book will therefore concentrate on general principles of rational agents and on components for constructing them. We will see that despite the apparent simplicity with which the problem can be stated, an enormous variety of issues come up when we try to solve it. Chapter 2 outlines some of these issues in more detail.

One important point to keep in mind: We will see before too long that achieving perfect rationality—always doing the right thing—is not feasible in complicated environments. The computational demands are just too high. For most of the book, however, we will adopt the working hypothesis that perfect rationality is a good starting point for analysis. It simplifies the problem and provides the appropriate setting for most of the foundational material in the field. Chapters 6 and 17 deal explicitly with the issue of limited rationality—acting appropriately when there is not enough time to do all the computations one might like.

1.2 THE FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

In this section, we provide a brief history of the disciplines that contributed ideas, viewpoints, and techniques to AI. Like any history, this one is forced to concentrate on a small number of people, events, and ideas and to ignore others that also were important. We organize the history around a series of questions. We certainly would not wish to give the impression that these questions are the only ones the disciplines address or that the disciplines have all been working toward AI as their ultimate fruition.

**Philosophy (428 B.C.–present)**

- Can formal rules be used to draw valid conclusions?
- How does the mental mind arise from a physical brain?
- Where does knowledge come from?
- How does knowledge lead to action?
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was the first to formulate a precise set of laws governing the rational part of the mind. He developed an informal system of syllogisms for proper reasoning, which in principle allowed one to generate conclusions mechanically, given initial premises. Much later, Ramon Lull (d. 1315) had the idea that useful reasoning could actually be carried out by a mechanical artifact. His “concept wheels” are on the cover of this book. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) proposed that reasoning was like numerical computation, that “we add and subtract in our silent thoughts.” The automation of computation itself was already well under way; around 1500, Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) designed but did not build a mechanical calculator; recent reconstructions have shown the design to be functional. The first known calculating machine was constructed around 1623 by the German scientist Wilhelm Schickard (1592–1635), although the Pascaline, built in 1642 by Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), is more famous. Pascal wrote that “the arithmetical machine produces effects which appear nearer to thought than all the actions of animals.” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) built a mechanical device intended to carry out operations on concepts rather than numbers, but its scope was rather limited.

Now that we have the idea of a set of rules that can describe the formal, rational part of the mind, the next step is to consider the mind as a physical system. René Descartes (1596–1650) gave the first clear discussion of the distinction between mind and matter and of the problems that arise. One problem with a purely physical conception of the mind is that it seems to leave little room for free will: if the mind is governed entirely by physical laws, then it has no more free will than a rock “deciding” to fall toward the center of the earth. Although a strong advocate of the power of reasoning, Descartes was also a proponent of dualism. He held that there is a part of the human mind (or soul or spirit) that is outside of nature, exempt from physical laws. Animals, on the other hand, did not possess this dual quality; they could be treated as machines. An alternative to dualism is materialism, which holds that the brain’s operation according to the laws of physics constitutes the mind. Free will is simply the way that the perception of available choices appears to the choice process.

Given a physical mind that manipulates knowledge, the next problem is to establish the source of knowledge. The empiricism movement, starting with Francis Bacon’s (1561–1626) Novum Organum, is characterized by a dictum of John Locke (1632–1704): “Nothing is in the understanding, which was not first in the senses.” David Hume’s (1711–1776) A Treatise of Human Nature (Hume, 1739) proposed what is now known as the principle of induction: that general rules are acquired by exposure to repeated associations between their elements. Building on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), the famous Vienna Circle, led by Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970), developed the doctrine of logical positivism. This doctrine holds that all knowledge can be characterized by logical theories connected, ultimately, to observation sentences that correspond to sensory inputs. The confirmation theory of Carnap and Carl Hempel (1905–1997) attempted to understand how knowledge can be acquired from experience. Carnap’s book The Logical Structure of

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3 An update of Aristotle’s Organon, or instrument of thought.
4 In this picture, all meaningful statements can be verified or falsified either by analyzing the meaning of the words or by carrying out experiments. Because this rules out most of metaphysics, as was the intention, logical positivism was unpopular in some circles.
the World (1928) defined an explicit computational procedure for extracting knowledge from elementary experiences. It was probably the first theory of mind as a computational process.

The final element in the philosophical picture of the mind is the connection between knowledge and action. This question is vital to AI, because intelligence requires action as well as reasoning. Moreover, only by understanding how actions are justified can we understand how to build an agent whose actions are justifiable (or rational). Aristotle argued that actions are justified by a logical connection between goals and knowledge of the action’s outcome (the last part of this extract also appears on the front cover of this book):

But how does it happen that thinking is sometimes accompanied by action and sometimes not, sometimes by motion, and sometimes not? It looks as if almost the same thing happens as in the case of reasoning and making inferences about unchanging objects. But in that case the end is a speculative proposition . . . whereas here the conclusion which results from the two premises is an action. . . . I need covering; a cloak is a covering. I need a cloak. What I need, I have to make; I need a cloak. I have to make a cloak. And the conclusion, the “I have to make a cloak,” is an action. (Nussbaum, 1978, p. 40)

In the Nicomachean Ethics (Book III. 3, 1112b), Aristotle further elaborates on this topic, suggesting an algorithm:

We deliberate not about ends, but about means. For a doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade, . . . They assume the end and consider how and by what means it is attained, and if it seems easily and best produced thereby; while if it is achieved by one means only they consider how it will be achieved by this and by what means this will be achieved, till they come to the first cause, . . . and what is last in the order of analysis seems to be first in the order of becoming. And if we come on an impossibility, we give up the search, e.g. if we need money and this cannot be got; but if a thing appears possible we try to do it.

Aristotle’s algorithm was implemented 2300 years later by Newell and Simon in their GPS program. We would now call it a regression planning system. (See Chapter 11.)

Goal-based analysis is useful, but does not say what to do when several actions will achieve the goal, or when no action will achieve it completely. Antoine Arnauld (1612–1694) correctly described a quantitative formula for deciding what action to take in cases like this (see Chapter 16). John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) book Utilitarianism (Mill, 1863) promoted the idea of rational decision criteria in all spheres of human activity. The more formal theory of decisions is discussed in the following section.

Mathematics (c. 800–present)

- What are the formal rules to draw valid conclusions?
- What can be computed?
- How do we reason with uncertain information?

Philosophers staked out most of the important ideas of AI, but the leap to a formal science required a level of mathematical formalization in three fundamental areas: logic, computation, and probability.

The idea of formal logic can be traced back to the philosophers of ancient Greece (see Chapter 7), but its mathematical development really began with the work of George Boole
(1815–1864), who worked out the details of propositional, or Boolean, logic (Boole, 1847). In 1879, Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) extended Boole’s logic to include objects and relations, creating the first-order logic that is used today as the most basic knowledge representation system. Alfred Tarski (1902–1983) introduced a theory of reference that shows how to relate the objects in a logic to objects in the real world. The next step was to determine the limits of what could be done with logic and computation.

The first nontrivial algorithm is thought to be Euclid’s algorithm for computing greatest common denominators. The study of algorithms as objects in themselves goes back to al-Khowarazmi, a Persian mathematician of the 9th century, whose writings also introduced Arabic numerals and algebra to Europe. Boole and others discussed algorithms for logical deduction, and, by the late 19th century, efforts were under way to formalize general mathematical reasoning as logical deduction. In 1900, David Hilbert (1862–1943) presented a list of 23 problems that he correctly predicted would occupy mathematicians for the bulk of the century. The final problem asks whether there is an algorithm for deciding the truth of any logical proposition involving the natural numbers—the famous Entscheidungsproblem, or decision problem. Essentially, Hilbert was asking whether there were fundamental limits to the power of effective proof procedures. In 1930, Kurt Gödel (1906–1978) showed that there exists an effective procedure to prove any true statement in the first-order logic of Frege and Russell, but that first-order logic could not capture the principle of mathematical induction needed to characterize the natural numbers. In 1931, he showed that real limits do exist. His incompleteness theorem showed that in any language expressive enough to describe the properties of the natural numbers, there are true statements that are undecidable in the sense that their truth cannot be established by any algorithm.

This fundamental result can also be interpreted as showing that there are some functions on the integers that cannot be represented by an algorithm—that is, they cannot be computed. This motivated Alan Turing (1912–1954) to try to characterize exactly which functions are capable of being computed. This notion is actually slightly problematic, because the notion of a computation or effective procedure really cannot be given a formal definition. However, the Church–Turing thesis, which states that the Turing machine (Turing, 1936) is capable of computing any computable function, is generally accepted as providing a sufficient definition. Turing also showed that there were some functions that no Turing machine can compute. For example, no machine can tell in general whether a given program will return an answer on a given input or run forever.

Although undecidability and noncomputability are important to an understanding of computation, the notion of intractability has had a much greater impact. Roughly speaking, a problem is called intractable if the time required to solve instances of the problem grows exponentially with the size of the instances. The distinction between polynomial and exponential growth in complexity was first emphasized in the mid-1960s (Cobham, 1964; Edmonds, 1965). It is important because exponential growth means that even moderately large instances cannot be solved in any reasonable time. Therefore, one should strive to divide

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5 Frege’s proposed notation for first-order logic never became popular, for reasons that are apparent immediately from the example on the front cover.
the overall problem of generating intelligent behavior into tractable subproblems rather than intractable ones.

How can one recognize an intractable problem? The theory of **NP-completeness**, pioneered by Steven Cook (1971) and Richard Karp (1972), provides a method. Cook and Karp showed the existence of large classes of canonical combinatorial search and reasoning problems that are NP-complete. Any problem class to which the class of NP-complete problems can be reduced is likely to be intractable. (Although it has not been proved that NP-complete problems are necessarily intractable, most theoreticians believe it.) These results contrast with the optimism with which the popular press greeted the first computers—“Electronic Super-Brains” that were “Faster than Einstein!” Despite the increasing speed of computers, careful use of resources will characterize intelligent systems. Put crudely, the world is an extremely large problem instance! In recent years, AI has helped explain why some instances of NP-complete problems are hard, yet others are easy (Cheeseman et al., 1991).

Besides logic and computation, the third great contribution of mathematics to AI is the theory of **probability**. The Italian Gerolamo Cardano (1501–1576) first framed the idea of probability, describing it in terms of the possible outcomes of gambling events. Probability quickly became an invaluable part of all the quantitative sciences, helping to deal with uncertain measurements and incomplete theories. Pierre Fermat (1601–1665), Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), James Bernoulli (1654–1705), Pierre Laplace (1749–1827), and others advanced the theory and introduced new statistical methods. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) proposed a rule for updating probabilities in the light of new evidence. Bayes’ rule and the resulting field called Bayesian analysis form the basis of most modern approaches to uncertain reasoning in AI systems.

**Economics (1776–present)**

- How should we make decisions so as to maximize payoff?
- How should we do this when others may not go along?
- How should we do this when the payoff may be far in the future?

The science of economics got its start in 1776, when Scottish philosopher Adam Smith (1723–1790) published *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. While the ancient Greeks and others had made contributions to economic thought, Smith was the first to treat it as a science, using the idea that economies can be thought of as consisting of individual agents maximizing their own economic well-being. Most people think of economics as being about money, but economists will say that they are really studying how people make choices that lead to preferred outcomes. The mathematical treatment of “preferred outcomes” or **utility** was first formalized by Léon Walras (pronounced “Valrasse”) (1834–1910) and was improved by Frank Ramsey (1931) and later by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in their book *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944).

**Decision theory**, which combines probability theory with utility theory, provides a formal and complete framework for decisions (economic or otherwise) made under uncertainty—that is, in cases where probabilistic descriptions appropriately capture the decision-maker’s environment. This is suitable for “large” economies where each agent need pay no attention
to the actions of other agents as individuals. For “small” economies, the situation is much more like a game: the actions of one player can significantly affect the utility of another (either positively or negatively). Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s development of game theory (see also Luce and Raiffa, 1957) included the surprising result that, for some games, a rational agent should act in a random fashion, or at least in a way that appears random to the adversaries.

For the most part, economists did not address the third question listed above, namely, how to make rational decisions when payoffs from actions are not immediate but instead result from several actions taken in sequence. This topic was pursued in the field of operations research, which emerged in World War II from efforts in Britain to optimize radar installations, and later found civilian applications in complex management decisions. The work of Richard Bellman (1957) formalized a class of sequential decision problems called Markov decision processes, which we study in Chapters 17 and 21.

Work in economics and operations research has contributed much to our notion of rational agents, yet for many years AI research developed along entirely separate paths. One reason was the apparent complexity of making rational decisions. Herbert Simon (1916–2001), the pioneering AI researcher, won the Nobel prize in economics in 1978 for his early work showing that models based on satisficing—making decisions that are “good enough,” rather than laboriously calculating an optimal decision—gave a better description of actual human behavior (Simon, 1947). In the 1990s, there has been a resurgence of interest in decision-theoretic techniques for agent systems (Wellman, 1995).

Neuroscience (1861–present)

- How do brains process information?

Neuroscience is the study of the nervous system, particularly the brain. The exact way in which the brain enables thought is one of the great mysteries of science. It has been appreciated for thousands of years that the brain is somehow involved in thought, because of the evidence that strong blows to the head can lead to mental incapacitation. It has also long been known that human brains are somehow different; in about 335 B.C., Aristotle wrote, “Of all the animals, man has the largest brain in proportion to his size.” Still, it was not until the middle of the 18th century that the brain was widely recognized as the seat of consciousness. Before then, candidate locations included the heart, the spleen, and the pineal gland.

Paul Broca’s (1824–1880) study of aphasia (speech deficit) in brain-damaged patients in 1861 reinvigorated the field and persuaded the medical establishment of the existence of localized areas of the brain responsible for specific cognitive functions. In particular, he showed that speech production was localized to a portion of the left hemisphere now called Broca’s area. By that time, it was known that the brain consisted of nerve cells or neurons, but it was not until 1873 that Camillo Golgi (1843–1926) developed a staining technique allowing the observation of individual neurons in the brain (see Figure 1.2). This technique

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6 Since then, it has been discovered that some species of dolphins and whales have relatively larger brains. The large size of human brains is now thought to be enabled in part by recent improvements in its cooling system.

7 Many cite Alexander Hood (1824) as a possible prior source.
Section 1.2. The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence

Figure 1.2 The parts of a nerve cell or neuron. Each neuron consists of a cell body, or soma, that contains a cell nucleus. Branching out from the cell body are a number of fibers called dendrites and a single long fiber called the axon. The axon stretches out for a long distance, much longer than the scale in this diagram indicates. Typically they are 1 cm long (100 times the diameter of the cell body), but can reach up to 1 meter. A neuron makes connections with 10 to 100,000 other neurons at junctions called synapses. Signals are propagated from neuron to neuron by a complicated electrochemical reaction. The signals control brain activity in the short term, and also enable long-term changes in the position and connectivity of neurons. These mechanisms are thought to form the basis for learning in the brain. Most information processing goes on in the cerebral cortex, the outer layer of the brain. The basic organizational unit appears to be a column of tissue about 0.5 mm in diameter, extending the full depth of the cortex, which is about 4 mm in humans. A column contains about 20,000 neurons.

was used by Santiago Ramon y Cajal (1852–1934) in his pioneering studies of the brain’s neuronal structures.\(^8\)

We now have some data on the mapping between areas of the brain and the parts of the body that they control or from which they receive sensory input. Such mappings are able to change radically over the course of a few weeks, and some animals seem to have multiple maps. Moreover, we do not fully understand how other areas can take over functions when one area is damaged. There is almost no theory on how an individual memory is stored.

The measurement of intact brain activity began in 1929 with the invention by Hans Berger of the electroencephalograph (EEG). The recent development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Ogawa et al., 1990) is giving neuroscientists unprecedentedly detailed images of brain activity, enabling measurements that correspond in interesting ways to ongoing cognitive processes. These are augmented by advances in single-cell recording of

\(^8\) Golgi persisted in his belief that the brain’s functions were carried out primarily in a continuous medium in which neurons were embedded, whereas Cajal propounded the “neuronal doctrine.” The two shared the Nobel prize in 1906 but gave rather antagonistic acceptance speeches.
neuron activity. Despite these advances, we are still a long way from understanding how any of these cognitive processes actually work.

The truly amazing conclusion is that a collection of simple cells can lead to thought, action, and consciousness or, in other words, that brains cause minds (Searle, 1992). The only real alternative theory is mysticism: that there is some mystical realm in which minds operate that is beyond physical science.

Brains and digital computers perform quite different tasks and have different properties. Figure 1.3 shows that there are 1000 times more neurons in the typical human brain than there are gates in the CPU of a typical high-end computer. Moore’s Law predicts that the CPU’s gate count will equal the brain’s neuron count around 2020. Of course, little can be inferred from such predictions; moreover, the difference in storage capacity is minor compared to the difference in switching speed and in parallelism. Computer chips can execute an instruction in a nanosecond, whereas neurons are millions of times slower. Brains more than make up for this, however, because all the neurons and synapses are active simultaneously, whereas most current computers have only one or at most a few CPUs. Thus, even though a computer is a million times faster in raw switching speed, the brain ends up being 100,000 times faster at what it does.

Psychology (1879–present)

- How do humans and animals think and act?

The origins of scientific psychology are usually traced to the work of the German physicist Hermann von Helmholtz (1821–1894) and his student Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920). Helmholtz applied the scientific method to the study of human vision, and his Handbook of Physiological Optics is even now described as “the single most important treatise on the physics and physiology of human vision” (Nalwa, 1993, p.15). In 1879, Wundt opened the first laboratory of experimental psychology at the University of Leipzig. Wundt insisted on carefully controlled experiments in which his workers would perform a perceptual or associa-

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9 Moore’s Law says that the number of transistors per square inch doubles every 1 to 1.5 years. Human brain capacity doubles roughly every 2 to 4 million years.
The careful controls went a long way toward making psychology a science, but the subjective nature of the data made it unlikely that an experimenter would ever disconfirm his or her own theories. Biologists studying animal behavior, on the other hand, lacked introspective data and developed an objective methodology, as described by H. S. Jennings (1906) in his influential work *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*. Applying this viewpoint to humans, the behaviorism movement, led by John Watson (1878–1958), rejected any theory involving mental processes on the grounds that introspection could not provide reliable evidence. Behaviorists insisted on studying only objective measures of the percepts (or stimulus) given to an animal and its resulting actions (or response). Mental constructs such as knowledge, beliefs, goals, and reasoning steps were dismissed as unscientific “folk psychology.” Behaviorism discovered a lot about rats and pigeons, but had less success at understanding humans. Nevertheless, it exerted a strong hold on psychology (especially in the United States) from about 1920 to 1960.

The view of the brain as an information-processing device, which is a principal characteristic of cognitive psychology, can be traced back at least to the works of William James (1842–1910). Helmholtz also insisted that perception involved a form of unconscious logical inference. The cognitive viewpoint was largely eclipsed by behaviorism in the United States, but at Cambridge’s Applied Psychology Unit, directed by Frederic Bartlett (1886–1969), cognitive modeling was able to flourish. *The Nature of Explanation*, by Bartlett’s student and successor Kenneth Craik (1943), forcefully reestablished the legitimacy of such “mental” terms as beliefs and goals, arguing that they are just as scientific as, say, using pressure and temperature to talk about gases, despite their being made of molecules that have neither. Craik specified the three key steps of a knowledge-based agent: (1) the stimulus must be translated into an internal representation, (2) the representation is manipulated by cognitive processes to derive new internal representations, and (3) these are in turn retranslated back into action. He clearly explained why this was a good design for an agent:

> If the organism carries a “small-scale model” of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the present and future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which face it. (Craik, 1943)

After Craik’s death in a bicycle accident in 1945, his work was continued by Donald Broadbent, whose book *Perception and Communication* (1958) included some of the first information-processing models of psychological phenomena. Meanwhile, in the United States, the development of computer modeling led to the creation of the field of cognitive science. The field can be said to have started at a workshop in September 1956 at MIT. (We shall see that this is just two months after the conference at which AI itself was “born.”) At the workshop, George Miller presented *The Magic Number Seven*, Noam Chomsky presented *Three Models of Language*, and Allen Newell and Herbert Simon presented *The Logic Theory Machine*. These three influential papers showed how computer models could be used to

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10 William James was the brother of novelist Henry James. It is said that Henry wrote fiction as if it were psychology and William wrote psychology as if it were fiction.
address the psychology of memory, language, and logical thinking, respectively. It is now a common view among psychologists that “a cognitive theory should be like a computer program” (Anderson, 1980), that is, it should describe a detailed information-processing mechanism whereby some cognitive function might be implemented.

**Computer engineering (1940–present)**

- How can we build an efficient computer?

For artificial intelligence to succeed, we need two things: intelligence and an artifact. The computer has been the artifact of choice. The modern digital electronic computer was invented independently and almost simultaneously by scientists in three countries embattled in World War II. The first operational computer was the electromechanical Heath Robinson,\(^{11}\) built in 1940 by Alan Turing’s team for a single purpose: deciphering German messages. In 1943, the same group developed the Colossus, a powerful general-purpose machine based on vacuum tubes.\(^{12}\) The first operational programmable computer was the Z-3, the invention of Konrad Zuse in Germany in 1941. Zuse also invented floating-point numbers and the first high-level programming language, Plankalkül. The first electronic computer, the ABC, was assembled by John Atanasoff and his student Clifford Berry between 1940 and 1942 at Iowa State University. Atanasoff’s research received little support or recognition; it was the ENIAC, developed as part of a secret military project at the University of Pennsylvania by a team including John Mauchly and John Eckert, that proved to be the most influential forerunner of modern computers.

In the half-century since then, each generation of computer hardware has brought an increase in speed and capacity and a decrease in price. Performance doubles every 18 months or so, with a decade or two to go at this rate of increase. After that, we will need molecular engineering or some other new technology.

Of course, there were calculating devices before the electronic computer. The earliest automated machines, dating from the 17th century, were discussed on page 6. The first programmable machine was a loom devised in 1805 by Joseph Marie Jacquard (1752–1834) that used punched cards to store instructions for the pattern to be woven. In the mid-19th century, Charles Babbage (1792–1871) designed two machines, neither of which he completed. The “Difference Engine,” which appears on the cover of this book, was intended to compute mathematical tables for engineering and scientific projects. It was finally built and shown to work in 1991 at the Science Museum in London (Swade, 1993). Babbage’s “Analytical Engine” was far more ambitious: it included addressable memory, stored programs, and conditional jumps and was the first artifact capable of universal computation. Babbage’s colleague Ada Lovelace, daughter of the poet Lord Byron, was perhaps the world’s first programmer. (The programming language Ada is named after her.) She wrote programs for the unfinished Analytical Engine and even speculated that the machine could play chess or compose music.

\(^{11}\) Heath Robinson was a cartoonist famous for his depictions of whimsical and absurdly complicated contraptions for everyday tasks such as buttering toast.

\(^{12}\) In the postwar period, Turing wanted to use these computers for AI research—for example, one of the first chess programs (Turing \textit{et al.}, 1953). His efforts were blocked by the British government.
AI also owes a debt to the software side of computer science, which has supplied the operating systems, programming languages, and tools needed to write modern programs (and papers about them). But this is one area where the debt has been repaid: work in AI has pioneered many ideas that have made their way back to mainstream computer science, including time sharing, interactive interpreters, personal computers with windows and mice, rapid development environments, the linked list data type, automatic storage management, and key concepts of symbolic, functional, dynamic, and object-oriented programming.

**Control theory and Cybernetics (1948–present)**

- How can artifacts operate under their own control?

Ktesibios of Alexandria (c. 250 B.C.) built the first self-controlling machine: a water clock with a regulator that kept the flow of water running through it at a constant, predictable pace. This invention changed the definition of what an artifact could do. Previously, only living things could modify their behavior in response to changes in the environment. Other examples of self-regulating feedback control systems include the steam engine governor, created by James Watt (1736–1819), and the thermostat, invented by Cornelis Drebbel (1572–1633), who also invented the submarine. The mathematical theory of stable feedback systems was developed in the 19th century.

The central figure in the creation of what is now called control theory was Norbert Wiener (1894–1964). Wiener was a brilliant mathematician who worked with Bertrand Russell, among others, before developing an interest in biological and mechanical control systems and their connection to cognition. Like Craik (who also used control systems as psychological models), Wiener and his colleagues Arturo Rosenblueth and Julian Bigelow challenged the behaviorist orthodoxy (Rosenblueth et al., 1943). They viewed purposive behavior as arising from a regulatory mechanism trying to minimize “error”—the difference between current state and goal state. In the late 1940s, Wiener, along with Warren McCulloch, Walter Pitts, and John von Neumann, organized a series of conferences that explored the new mathematical and computational models of cognition and influenced many other researchers in the behavioral sciences. Wiener’s book *Cybernetics* (1948) became a bestseller and awoke the public to the possibility of artificially intelligent machines.

Modern control theory, especially the branch known as stochastic optimal control, has as its goal the design of systems that maximize an objective function over time. This roughly matches our view of AI: designing systems that behave optimally. Why, then, are AI and control theory two different fields, especially given the close connections among their founders? The answer lies in the close coupling between the mathematical techniques that were familiar to the participants and the corresponding sets of problems that were encompassed in each world view. Calculus and matrix algebra, the tools of control theory, lend themselves to systems that are describable by fixed sets of continuous variables; furthermore, exact analysis is typically feasible only for linear systems. AI was founded in part as a way to escape from the limitations of the mathematics of control theory in the 1950s. The tools of logical inference and computation allowed AI researchers to consider some problems such as language, vision, and planning, that fell completely outside the control theorist’s purview.
Linguistics (1957–present)

- How does language relate to thought?

In 1957, B. F. Skinner published *Verbal Behavior*. This was a comprehensive, detailed account of the behaviorist approach to language learning, written by the foremost expert in the field. But curiously, a review of the book became as well known as the book itself, and served to almost kill off interest in behaviorism. The author of the review was Noam Chomsky, who had just published a book on his own theory, *Syntactic Structures*. Chomsky showed how the behaviorist theory did not address the notion of creativity in language—it did not explain how a child could understand and make up sentences that he or she had never heard before. Chomsky’s theory—based on syntactic models going back to the Indian linguist Panini (c. 350 B.C.)—could explain this, and unlike previous theories, it was formal enough that it could in principle be programmed.

Modern linguistics and AI, then, were “born” at about the same time, and grew up together, intersecting in a hybrid field called computational linguistics or natural language processing. The problem of understanding language soon turned out to be considerably more complex than it seemed in 1957. Understanding language requires an understanding of the subject matter and context, not just an understanding of the structure of sentences. This might seem obvious, but it was not widely appreciated until the 1960s. Much of the early work in knowledge representation (the study of how to put knowledge into a form that a computer can reason with) was tied to language and informed by research in linguistics, which was connected in turn to decades of work on the philosophical analysis of language.

1.3 The History of Artificial Intelligence

With the background material behind us, we are ready to cover the development of AI itself.

**The gestation of artificial intelligence (1943–1955)**

The first work that is now generally recognized as AI was done by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts (1943). They drew on three sources: knowledge of the basic physiology and function of neurons in the brain; a formal analysis of propositional logic due to Russell and Whitehead; and Turing’s theory of computation. They proposed a model of artificial neurons in which each neuron is characterized as being “on” or “off,” with a switch to “on” occurring in response to stimulation by a sufficient number of neighboring neurons. The state of a neuron was conceived of as “factually equivalent to a proposition which proposed its adequate stimulus.” They showed, for example, that any computable function could be computed by some network of connected neurons, and that all the logical connectives (and, or, not, etc.) could be implemented by simple net structures. McCulloch and Pitts also suggested that suitably defined networks could learn. Donald Hebb (1949) demonstrated a simple updating rule for modifying the connection strengths between neurons. His rule, now called Hebbian learning, remains an influential model to this day.
Two graduate students in the Princeton mathematics department, Marvin Minsky and Dean Edmonds, built the first neural network computer in 1951. The SNARC, as it was called, used 3000 vacuum tubes and a surplus automatic pilot mechanism from a B-24 bomber to simulate a network of 40 neurons. Minsky’s Ph.D. committee was skeptical about whether this kind of work should be considered mathematics, but von Neumann reportedly said, “If it isn’t now, it will be someday.” Minsky was later to prove influential theorems showing the limitations of neural network research.

There were a number of early examples of work that can be characterized as AI, but it was Alan Turing who first articulated a complete vision of AI in his 1950 article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Therein, he introduced the Turing test, machine learning, genetic algorithms, and reinforcement learning.

The birth of artificial intelligence (1956)

Princeton was home to another influential figure in AI, John McCarthy. After graduation, McCarthy moved to Dartmouth College, which was to become the official birthplace of the field. McCarthy convinced Minsky, Claude Shannon, and Nathaniel Rochester to help him bring together U.S. researchers interested in automata theory, neural nets, and the study of intelligence. They organized a two-month workshop at Dartmouth in the summer of 1956. There were 10 attendees in all, including Trenchard More from Princeton, Arthur Samuel from IBM, and Ray Solomonoff and Oliver Selfridge from MIT.

Two researchers from Carnegie Tech, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon, rather stole the show. Although the others had ideas and in some cases programs for particular applications such as checkers, Newell and Simon already had a reasoning program, the Logic Theorist (LT), about which Simon claimed, “We have invented a computer program capable of thinking non-numerically, and thereby solved the venerable mind–body problem.” Soon after the workshop, the program was able to prove most of the theorems in Chapter 2 of Russell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*. Russell was reportedly delighted when Simon showed him that the program had come up with a proof for one theorem that was shorter than the one in *Principia*. The editors of the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* were less impressed; they rejected a paper coauthored by Newell, Simon, and Logic Theorist.

The Dartmouth workshop did not lead to any new breakthroughs, but it did introduce all the major figures to each other. For the next 20 years, the field would be dominated by these people and their students and colleagues at MIT, CMU, Stanford, and IBM. Perhaps the longest-lasting thing to come out of the workshop was an agreement to adopt McCarthy’s new name for the field: artificial intelligence. Perhaps “computational rationality” would have been better, but “AI” has stuck.

Looking at the proposal for the Dartmouth workshop (McCarthy *et al.*, 1955), we can see why it was necessary for AI to become a separate field. Why couldn’t all the work done

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13 Now Carnegie Mellon University (CMU).
14 Newell and Simon also invented a list-processing language, IPL, to write LT. They had no compiler, and translated it into machine code by hand. To avoid errors, they worked in parallel, calling out binary numbers to each other as they wrote each instruction to make sure they agreed.
in AI have taken place under the name of control theory, or operations research, or decision theory, which, after all, have objectives similar to those of AI? Or why isn’t AI a branch of mathematics? The first answer is that AI from the start embraced the idea of duplicating human faculties like creativity, self-improvement, and language use. None of the other fields were addressing these issues. The second answer is methodology. AI is the only one of these fields that is clearly a branch of computer science (although operations research does share an emphasis on computer simulations), and AI is the only field to attempt to build machines that will function autonomously in complex, changing environments.

**Early enthusiasm, great expectations (1952–1969)**

The early years of AI were full of successes—in a limited way. Given the primitive computers and programming tools of the time, and the fact that only a few years earlier computers were seen as things that could do arithmetic and no more, it was astonishing whenever a computer did anything remotely clever. The intellectual establishment, by and large, preferred to believe that “a machine can never do X.” (See Chapter 26 for a long list of X’s gathered by Turing.) AI researchers naturally responded by demonstrating one X after another. John McCarthy referred to this period as the “Look, Ma, no hands!” era.

Newell and Simon’s early success was followed up with the General Problem Solver, or GPS. Unlike Logic Theorist, this program was designed from the start to imitate human problem-solving protocols. Within the limited class of puzzles it could handle, it turned out that the order in which the program considered subgoals and possible actions was similar to that in which humans approached the same problems. Thus, GPS was probably the first program to embody the “thinking humanly” approach. The success of GPS and subsequent programs as models of cognition led Newell and Simon (1976) to formulate the famous physical symbol system hypothesis, which states that “a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action.” What they meant is that any system (human or machine) exhibiting intelligence must operate by manipulating data structures composed of symbols. We will see later that this hypothesis has been challenged from many directions.

At IBM, Nathaniel Rochester and his colleagues produced some of the first AI programs. Herbert Gelernter (1959) constructed the Geometry Theorem Prover, which was able to prove theorems that many students of mathematics would find quite tricky. Starting in 1952, Arthur Samuel wrote a series of programs for checkers (draughts) that eventually learned to play at a strong amateur level. Along the way, he disproved the idea that computers can do only what they are told to: his program quickly learned to play a better game than its creator. The program was demonstrated on television in February 1956, creating a very strong impression. Like Turing, Samuel had trouble finding computer time. Working at night, he used machines that were still on the testing floor at IBM’s manufacturing plant. Chapter 6 covers game playing, and Chapter 21 describes and expands on the learning techniques used by Samuel.

John McCarthy moved from Dartmouth to MIT and there made three crucial contributions in one historic year: 1958. In MIT AI Lab Memo No. 1, McCarthy defined the high-level language Lisp, which was to become the dominant AI programming language. Lisp is the
second-oldest major high-level language in current use, one year younger than FORTRAN. With Lisp, McCarthy had the tool he needed, but access to scarce and expensive computing resources was also a serious problem. In response, he and others at MIT invented time sharing. Also in 1958, McCarthy published a paper entitled *Programs with Common Sense*, in which he described the Advice Taker, a hypothetical program that can be seen as the first complete AI system. Like the Logic Theorist and Geometry Theorem Prover, McCarthy’s program was designed to use knowledge to search for solutions to problems. But unlike the others, it was to embody general knowledge of the world. For example, he showed how some simple axioms would enable the program to generate a plan to drive to the airport to catch a plane. The program was also designed so that it could accept new axioms in the normal course of operation, thereby allowing it to achieve competence in new areas without being reprogrammed. The Advice Taker thus embodied the central principles of knowledge representation and reasoning: that it is useful to have a formal, explicit representation of the world and of the way an agent’s actions affect the world and to be able to manipulate these representations with deductive processes. It is remarkable how much of the 1958 paper remains relevant even today.

1958 also marked the year that Marvin Minsky moved to MIT. His initial collaboration with McCarthy did not last, however. McCarthy stressed representation and reasoning in formal logic, whereas Minsky was more interested in getting programs to work and eventually developed an anti-logical outlook. In 1963, McCarthy started the AI lab at Stanford. His plan to use logic to build the ultimate Advice Taker was advanced by J. A. Robinson’s discovery of the resolution method (a complete theorem-proving algorithm for first-order logic; see Chapter 9). Work at Stanford emphasized general-purpose methods for logical reasoning. Applications of logic included Cordell Green’s question-answering and planning systems (Green, 1969b) and the Shakey robotics project at the new Stanford Research Institute (SRI). The latter project, discussed further in Chapter 25, was the first to demonstrate the complete integration of logical reasoning and physical activity.

Minsky supervised a series of students who chose limited problems that appeared to require intelligence to solve. These limited domains became known as microworlds. James Slagle’s SAINT program (1963a) was able to solve closed-form calculus integration problems typical of first-year college courses. Tom Evans’s ANALOGY program (1968) solved geometric analogy problems that appear in IQ tests, such as the one in Figure 1.4. Daniel Bobrow’s STUDENT program (1967) solved algebra story problems, such as the following:

If the number of customers Tom gets is twice the square of 20 percent of the number of advertisements he runs, and the number of advertisements he runs is 45, what is the number of customers Tom gets?

The most famous microworld was the blocks world, which consists of a set of solid blocks placed on a tabletop (or more often, a simulation of a tabletop), as shown in Figure 1.5. A typical task in this world is to rearrange the blocks in a certain way, using a robot hand that can pick up one block at a time. The blocks world was home to the vision project of David Huffman (1971), the vision and constraint-propagation work of David Waltz (1975), the learning theory of Patrick Winston (1970), the natural language understanding program
Early work building on the neural networks of McCulloch and Pitts also flourished. The work of Winograd and Cowan (1963) showed how a large number of elements could collectively represent an individual concept, with a corresponding increase in robustness and parallelism. Hebb’s learning methods were enhanced by Bernie Widrow (Widrow and Hoff, 1960).
1960; Widrow, 1962), who called his networks adalines, and by Frank Rosenblatt (1962) with his perceptrons. Rosenblatt proved the perceptron convergence theorem, showing that his learning algorithm could adjust the connection strengths of a perceptron to match any input data, provided such a match existed. These topics are covered in Chapter 20.


From the beginning, AI researchers were not shy about making predictions of their coming successes. The following statement by Herbert Simon in 1957 is often quoted:

> It is not my aim to surprise or shock you—but the simplest way I can summarize is to say that there are now in the world machines that think, that learn and that create. Moreover, their ability to do these things is going to increase rapidly until—in a visible future—the range of problems they can handle will be coextensive with the range to which the human mind has been applied.

Terms such as “visible future” can be interpreted in various ways, but Simon also made a more concrete prediction: that within 10 years a computer would be chess champion, and a significant mathematical theorem would be proved by machine. These predictions came true (or approximately true) within 40 years rather than 10. Simon’s over-confidence was due to the promising performance of early AI systems on simple examples. In almost all cases, however, these early systems turned out to fail miserably when tried out on wider selections of problems and on more difficult problems.

The first kind of difficulty arose because most early programs contained little or no knowledge of their subject matter; they succeeded by means of simple syntactic manipulations. A typical story occurred in early machine translation efforts, which were generously funded by the U.S. National Research Council in an attempt to speed up the translation of Russian scientific papers in the wake of the Sputnik launch in 1957. It was thought initially that simple syntactic transformations based on the grammars of Russian and English, and word replacement using an electronic dictionary, would suffice to preserve the exact meanings of sentences. The fact is that translation requires general knowledge of the subject matter in order to resolve ambiguity and establish the content of the sentence. The famous re-translation of “the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak” as “the vodka is good but the meat is rotten” illustrates the difficulties encountered. In 1966, a report by an advisory committee found that “there has been no machine translation of general scientific text, and none is in immediate prospect.” All U.S. government funding for academic translation projects was canceled. Today, machine translation is an imperfect but widely used tool for technical, commercial, government, and Internet documents.

The second kind of difficulty was the intractability of many of the problems that AI was attempting to solve. Most of the early AI programs solved problems by trying out different combinations of steps until the solution was found. This strategy worked initially because microworlds contained very few objects and hence very few possible actions and very short solution sequences. Before the theory of computational complexity was developed, it was widely thought that “scaling up” to larger problems was simply a matter of faster hardware and larger memories. The optimism that accompanied the development of resolution theorem
proving, for example, was soon dampened when researchers failed to prove theorems involving more than a few dozen facts. The fact that a program can find a solution in principle does not mean that the program contains any of the mechanisms needed to find it in practice.

The illusion of unlimited computational power was not confined to problem-solving programs. Early experiments in machine evolution (now called genetic algorithms) (Friedberg, 1958; Friedberg et al., 1959) were based on the undoubtedly correct belief that by making an appropriate series of small mutations to a machine code program, one can generate a program with good performance for any particular simple task. The idea, then, was to try random mutations with a selection process to preserve mutations that seemed useful. Despite thousands of hours of CPU time, almost no progress was demonstrated. Modern genetic algorithms use better representations and have shown more success.

Failure to come to grips with the “combinatorial explosion” was one of the main criticisms of AI contained in the Lighthill report (Lighthill, 1973), which formed the basis for the decision by the British government to end support for AI research in all but two universities. (Oral tradition paints a somewhat different and more colorful picture, with political ambitions and personal animosities whose description is beside the point.)

A third difficulty arose because of some fundamental limitations on the basic structures being used to generate intelligent behavior. For example, Minsky and Papert’s book Perceptrons (1969) proved that, although perceptrons (a simple form of neural network) could be shown to learn anything they were capable of representing, they could represent very little. In particular, a two-input perceptron could not be trained to recognize when its two inputs were different. Although their results did not apply to more complex, multilayer networks, research funding for neural-net research soon dwindled to almost nothing. Ironically, the new back-propagation learning algorithms for multilayer networks that were to cause an enormous resurgence in neural-net research in the late 1980s were actually discovered first in 1969 (Bryson and Ho, 1969).

Knowledge-based systems: The key to power? (1969–1979)

The picture of problem solving that had arisen during the first decade of AI research was of a general-purpose search mechanism trying to string together elementary reasoning steps to find complete solutions. Such approaches have been called weak methods, because, although general, they do not scale up to large or difficult problem instances. The alternative to weak methods is to use more powerful, domain-specific knowledge that allows larger reasoning steps and can more easily handle typically occurring cases in narrow areas of expertise. One might say that to solve a hard problem, you have to almost know the answer already.

The DENDRAL program (Buchanan et al., 1969) was an early example of this approach. It was developed at Stanford, where Ed Feigenbaum (a former student of Herbert Simon), Bruce Buchanan (a philosopher turned computer scientist), and Joshua Lederberg (a Nobel laureate geneticist) teamed up to solve the problem of inferring molecular structure from the information provided by a mass spectrometer. The input to the program consists of the elementary formula of the molecule (e.g., C₆H₁₃NO₂) and the mass spectrum giving the masses of the various fragments of the molecule generated when it is bombarded by an electron beam.
For example, the mass spectrum might contain a peak at $m = 15$, corresponding to the mass of a methyl (CH$_3$) fragment.

The naive version of the program generated all possible structures consistent with the formula, and then predicted what mass spectrum would be observed for each, comparing this with the actual spectrum. As one might expect, this is intractable for decent-sized molecules. The DENDRAL researchers consulted analytical chemists and found that they worked by looking for well-known patterns of peaks in the spectrum that suggested common substructures in the molecule. For example, the following rule is used to recognize a ketone (C=O) subgroup (which weighs 28):

\[
\text{if there are two peaks at } x_1 \text{ and } x_2 \text{ such that} \\
\begin{align*}
(a) \quad & x_1 + x_2 = M + 28 \quad (M \text{ is the mass of the whole molecule);} \\
(b) \quad & x_1 - 28 \text{ is a high peak;} \\
(c) \quad & x_2 - 28 \text{ is a high peak;} \\
(d) \quad & \text{At least one of } x_1 \text{ and } x_2 \text{ is high.} \\
\text{then there is a ketone subgroup}
\end{align*}
\]

Recognizing that the molecule contains a particular substructure reduces the number of possible candidates enormously. DENDRAL was powerful because

All the relevant theoretical knowledge to solve these problems has been mapped over from its general form in the [spectrum prediction component] (“first principles”) to efficient special forms (“cookbook recipes”). (Feigenbaum et al., 1971)

The significance of DENDRAL was that it was the first successful knowledge-intensive system: its expertise derived from large numbers of special-purpose rules. Later systems also incorporated the main theme of McCarthy’s Advice Taker approach—the clean separation of the knowledge (in the form of rules) from the reasoning component.

With this lesson in mind, Feigenbaum and others at Stanford began the Heuristic Programming Project (HPP), to investigate the extent to which the new methodology of expert systems could be applied to other areas of human expertise. The next major effort was in the area of medical diagnosis. Feigenbaum, Buchanan, and Dr. Edward Shortliffe developed MYCIN to diagnose blood infections. With about 450 rules, MYCIN was able to perform as well as some experts, and considerably better than junior doctors. It also contained two major differences from DENDRAL. First, unlike the DENDRAL rules, no general theoretical model existed from which the MYCIN rules could be deduced. They had to be acquired from extensive interviewing of experts, who in turn acquired them from textbooks, other experts, and direct experience of cases. Second, the rules had to reflect the uncertainty associated with medical knowledge. MYCIN incorporated a calculus of uncertainty called certainty factors (see Chapter 13), which seemed (at the time) to fit well with how doctors assessed the impact of evidence on the diagnosis.

The importance of domain knowledge was also apparent in the area of understanding natural language. Although Winograd’s SHRDLU system for understanding natural language had engendered a good deal of excitement, its dependence on syntactic analysis caused some of the same problems as occurred in the early machine translation work. It was able to overcome ambiguity and understand pronoun references, but this was mainly because it was
designed specifically for one area—the blocks world. Several researchers, including Eugene Charniak, a fellow graduate student of Winograd’s at MIT, suggested that robust language understanding would require general knowledge about the world and a general method for using that knowledge.

At Yale, the linguist-turned-AI-researcher Roger Schank emphasized this point, claiming, “There is no such thing as syntax,” which upset a lot of linguists, but did serve to start a useful discussion. Schank and his students built a series of programs (Schank and Abelson, 1977; Wilensky, 1978; Schank and Riesbeck, 1981; Dyer, 1983) that all had the task of understanding natural language. The emphasis, however, was less on language per se and more on the problems of representing and reasoning with the knowledge required for language understanding. The problems included representing stereotypical situations (Cullingford, 1981), describing human memory organization (Rieger, 1976; Kolodner, 1983), and understanding plans and goals (Wilensky, 1983).

The widespread growth of applications to real-world problems caused a concurrent increase in the demands for workable knowledge representation schemes. A large number of different representation and reasoning languages were developed. Some were based on logic—for example, the Prolog language became popular in Europe, and the PLANNER family in the United States. Others, following Minsky’s idea of frames (1975), adopted a more structured approach, assembling facts about particular object and event types and arranging the types into a large taxonomic hierarchy analogous to a biological taxonomy.

**AI becomes an industry (1980–present)**

The first successful commercial expert system, R1, began operation at the Digital Equipment Corporation (McDermott, 1982). The program helped configure orders for new computer systems; by 1986, it was saving the company an estimated $40 million a year. By 1988, DEC’s AI group had 40 expert systems deployed, with more on the way. Du Pont had 100 in use and 500 in development, saving an estimated $10 million a year. Nearly every major U.S. corporation had its own AI group and was either using or investigating expert systems.

In 1981, the Japanese announced the “Fifth Generation” project, a 10-year plan to build intelligent computers running Prolog. In response the United States formed the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) as a research consortium designed to assure national competitiveness. In both cases, AI was part of a broad effort, including chip design and human-interface research. However, the AI components of MCC and the Fifth Generation projects never met their ambitious goals. In Britain, the Alvey report reinstated the funding that was cut by the Lighthill report.15

Overall, the AI industry boomed from a few million dollars in 1980 to billions of dollars in 1988. Soon after that came a period called the “AI Winter,” in which many companies suffered as they failed to deliver on extravagant promises.

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15 To save embarrassment, a new field called IKBS (Intelligent Knowledge-Based Systems) was invented because Artificial Intelligence had been officially canceled.
The return of neural networks (1986–present)

Although computer science had largely abandoned the field of neural networks in the late 1970s, work continued in other fields. Physicists such as John Hopfield (1982) used techniques from statistical mechanics to analyze the storage and optimization properties of networks, treating collections of nodes like collections of atoms. Psychologists including David Rumelhart and Geoff Hinton continued the study of neural-net models of memory. As we discuss in Chapter 20, the real impetus came in the mid-1980s when at least four different groups reinvented the back-propagation learning algorithm first found in 1969 by Bryson and Ho. The algorithm was applied to many learning problems in computer science and psychology, and the widespread dissemination of the results in the collection *Parallel Distributed Processing* (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986) caused great excitement.

These so-called connectionist models of intelligent systems were seen by some as direct competitors both to the symbolic models promoted by Newell and Simon and to the logicist approach of McCarthy and others (Smolensky, 1988). It might seem obvious that at some level humans manipulate symbols—in fact, Terrence Deacon’s book *The Symbolic Species* (1997) suggests that this is the defining characteristic of humans, but the most ardent connectionists questioned whether symbol manipulation had any real explanatory role in detailed models of cognition. This question remains unanswered, but the current view is that connectionist and symbolic approaches are complementary, not competing.

AI becomes a science (1987–present)

Recent years have seen a revolution in both the content and the methodology of work in artificial intelligence.\(^{16}\) It is now more common to build on existing theories than to propose brand new ones, to base claims on rigorous theorems or hard experimental evidence rather than on intuition, and to show relevance to real-world applications rather than toy examples.

AI was founded in part as a rebellion against the limitations of existing fields like control theory and statistics, but now it is embracing those fields. As David McAllester (1998) put it,

> In the early period of AI it seemed plausible that new forms of symbolic computation, e.g., frames and semantic networks, made much of classical theory obsolete. This led to a form of isolationism in which AI became largely separated from the rest of computer science. This isolationism is currently being abandoned. There is a recognition that machine learning should not be isolated from information theory, that uncertain reasoning should not be isolated from stochastic modeling, that search should not be isolated from classical optimization and control, and that automated reasoning should not be isolated from formal methods and static analysis.

In terms of methodology, AI has finally come firmly under the scientific method. To be accepted, hypotheses must be subjected to rigorous empirical experiments, and the results must

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\(^{16}\) Some have characterized this change as a victory of the *neats*—those who think that AI theories should be grounded in mathematical rigor—over the *scruffies*—those who would rather try out lots of ideas, write some programs, and then assess what seems to be working. Both approaches are important. A shift toward neatness implies that the field has reached a level of stability and maturity. Whether that stability will be disrupted by a new scruffy idea is another question.
be analyzed statistically for their importance (Cohen, 1995). Through the use of the Internet and shared repositories of test data and code, it is now possible to replicate experiments.

The field of speech recognition illustrates the pattern. In the 1970s, a wide variety of different architectures and approaches were tried. Many of these were rather ad hoc and fragile, and were demonstrated on only a few specially selected examples. In recent years, approaches based on hidden Markov models (HMMs) have come to dominate the area. Two aspects of HMMs are relevant. First, they are based on a rigorous mathematical theory. This has allowed speech researchers to build on several decades of mathematical results developed in other fields. Second, they are generated by a process of training on a large corpus of real speech data. This ensures that the performance is robust, and in rigorous blind tests the HMMs have been improving their scores steadily. Speech technology and the related field of handwritten character recognition are already making the transition to widespread industrial and consumer applications.

Neural networks also fit this trend. Much of the work on neural nets in the 1980s was done in an attempt to scope out what could be done and to learn how neural nets differ from “traditional” techniques. Using improved methodology and theoretical frameworks, the field arrived at an understanding in which neural nets can now be compared with corresponding techniques from statistics, pattern recognition, and machine learning, and the most promising technique can be applied to each application. As a result of these developments, so-called data mining technology has spawned a vigorous new industry.

Judea Pearl’s (1988) Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems led to a new acceptance of probability and decision theory in AI, following a resurgence of interest epitomized by Peter Cheeseman’s (1985) article “In Defense of Probability.” The Bayesian network formalism was invented to allow efficient representation of, and rigorous reasoning with, uncertain knowledge. This approach largely overcomes many problems of the probabilistic reasoning systems of the 1960s and 1970s: it now dominates AI research on uncertain reasoning and expert systems. The approach allows for learning from experience, and it combines the best of classical AI and neural nets. Work by Judea Pearl (1982a) and by Eric Horvitz and David Heckerman (Horvitz and Heckerman, 1986; Horvitz et al., 1986) promoted the idea of normative expert systems: ones that act rationally according to the laws of decision theory and do not try to imitate the thought steps of human experts. The Windows™ operating system includes several normative diagnostic expert systems for correcting problems. Chapters 13 to 16 cover this area.

Similar gentle revolutions have occurred in robotics, computer vision, and knowledge representation. A better understanding of the problems and their complexity properties, combined with increased mathematical sophistication, has led to workable research agendas and robust methods. In many cases, formalization and specialization have also led to fragmentation: topics such as vision and robotics are increasingly isolated form “mainstream” AI work. The unifying view of AI as rational agent design is one that can bring unity back to these disparate fields.
The emergence of intelligent agents (1995–present)

Perhaps encouraged by the progress in solving the subproblems of AI, researchers have also started to look at the “whole agent” problem again. The work of Allen Newell, John Laird, and Paul Rosenbloom on SOAR (Newell, 1990; Laird et al., 1987) is the best-known example of a complete agent architecture. The so-called situated movement aims to understand the workings of agents embedded in real environments with continuous sensory inputs. One of the most important environments for intelligent agents is the Internet. AI systems have become so common in web-based applications that the “-bot” suffix has entered everyday language. Moreover, AI technologies underlie many Internet tools, such as search engines, recommender systems, and Web site construction systems.

Besides the first edition of this text (Russell and Norvig, 1995), other recent texts have also adopted the agent perspective (Poole et al., 1998; Nilsson, 1998). One consequence of trying to build complete agents is the realization that the previously isolated subfields of AI might need to be reorganized somewhat when their results are to be tied together. In particular, it is now widely appreciated that sensory systems (vision, sonar, speech recognition, etc.) cannot deliver perfectly reliable information about the environment. Hence, reasoning and planning systems must be able to handle uncertainty. A second major consequence of the agent perspective is that AI has been drawn into much closer contact with other fields, such as control theory and economics, that also deal with agents.

1.4 THE STATE OF THE ART

What can AI do today? A concise answer is difficult, because there are so many activities in so many subfields. Here we sample a few applications; others appear throughout the book.

Autonomous planning and scheduling: A hundred million miles from Earth, NASA’s Remote Agent program became the first on-board autonomous planning program to control the scheduling of operations for a spacecraft (Jonsson et al., 2000). Remote Agent generated plans from high-level goals specified from the ground, and it monitored the operation of the spacecraft as the plans were executed—detecting, diagnosing, and recovering from problems as they occurred.

Game playing: IBM’s Deep Blue became the first computer program to defeat the world champion in a chess match when it bested Garry Kasparov by a score of 3.5 to 2.5 in an exhibition match (Goodman and Keene, 1997). Kasparov said that he felt a “new kind of intelligence” across the board from him. Newsweek magazine described the match as “The brain’s last stand.” The value of IBM’s stock increased by $18 billion.

Autonomous control: The ALVINN computer vision system was trained to steer a car to keep it following a lane. It was placed in CMU’s NAVLAB computer-controlled minivan and used to navigate across the United States—for 2850 miles it was in control of steering the vehicle 98% of the time. A human took over the other 2%, mostly at exit ramps. NAVLAB has video cameras that transmit road images to ALVINN, which then computes the best direction to steer, based on experience from previous training runs.
**Diagnosis:** Medical diagnosis programs based on probabilistic analysis have been able to perform at the level of an expert physician in several areas of medicine. Heckerman (1991) describes a case where a leading expert on lymph-node pathology scoffs at a program’s diagnosis of an especially difficult case. The creators of the program suggest he ask the computer for an explanation of the diagnosis. The machine points out the major factors influencing its decision and explains the subtle interaction of several of the symptoms in this case. Eventually, the expert agrees with the program.

**Logistics Planning:** During the Persian Gulf crisis of 1991, U.S. forces deployed a Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool, DART (Cross and Walker, 1994), to do automated logistics planning and scheduling for transportation. This involved up to 50,000 vehicles, cargo, and people at a time, and had to account for starting points, destinations, routes, and conflict resolution among all parameters. The AI planning techniques allowed a plan to be generated in hours that would have taken weeks with older methods. The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) stated that this single application more than paid back DARPA’s 30-year investment in AI.

**Robotics:** Many surgeons now use robot assistants in microsurgery. HipNav (DiGioia et al., 1996) is a system that uses computer vision techniques to create a three-dimensional model of a patient’s internal anatomy and then uses robotic control to guide the insertion of a hip replacement prosthesis.

**Language understanding and problem solving:** PROVERB (Littman et al., 1999) is a computer program that solves crossword puzzles better than most humans, using constraints on possible word fillers, a large database of past puzzles, and a variety of information sources including dictionaries and online databases such as a list of movies and the actors that appear in them. For example, it determines that the clue “Nice Story” can be solved by “ETAGE” because its database includes the clue/solution pair “Story in France/ETAGE” and because it recognizes that the patterns “Nice X” and “X in France” often have the same solution. The program does not know that Nice is a city in France, but it can solve the puzzle.

These are just a few examples of artificial intelligence systems that exist today. Not magic or science fiction—but rather science, engineering, and mathematics, to which this book provides an introduction.

### 1.5 Summary

This chapter defines AI and establishes the cultural background against which it has developed. Some of the important points are as follows:

- Different people think of AI differently. Two important questions to ask are: Are you concerned with thinking or behavior? Do you want to model humans or work from an ideal standard?

- In this book, we adopt the view that intelligence is concerned mainly with **rational action**. Ideally, an **intelligent agent** takes the best possible action in a situation. We will study the problem of building agents that are intelligent in this sense.
Philosophers (going back to 400 B.C.) made AI conceivable by considering the ideas that the mind is in some ways like a machine, that it operates on knowledge encoded in some internal language, and that thought can be used to choose what actions to take.

Mathematicians provided the tools to manipulate statements of logical certainty as well as uncertain, probabilistic statements. They also set the groundwork for understanding computation and reasoning about algorithms.

Economists formalized the problem of making decisions that maximize the expected outcome to the decision-maker.

Psychologists adopted the idea that humans and animals can be considered information-processing machines. Linguists showed that language use fits into this model.

Computer engineers provided the artifacts that make AI applications possible. AI programs tend to be large, and they could not work without the great advances in speed and memory that the computer industry has provided.

Control theory deals with designing devices that act optimally on the basis of feedback from the environment. Initially, the mathematical tools of control theory were quite different from AI, but the fields are coming closer together.

The history of AI has had cycles of success, misplaced optimism, and resulting cutbacks in enthusiasm and funding. There have also been cycles of introducing new creative approaches and systematically refining the best ones.

AI has advanced more rapidly in the past decade because of greater use of the scientific method in experimenting with and comparing approaches.

Recent progress in understanding the theoretical basis for intelligence has gone hand in hand with improvements in the capabilities of real systems. The subfields of AI have become more integrated, and AI has found common ground with other disciplines.

**BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES**

The methodological status of artificial intelligence is investigated in *The Sciences of the Artificial*, by Herb Simon (1981), which discusses research areas concerned with complex artifacts. It explains how AI can be viewed as both science and mathematics. Cohen (1995) gives an overview of experimental methodology within AI. Ford and Hayes (1995) give an opinionated view of the usefulness of the Turing Test.


Early AI is described in Feigenbaum and Feldman’s *Computers and Thought* (1963), Minsky’s *Semantic Information Processing* (1968), and the *Machine Intelligence* series edited by Donald Michie. A large number of influential papers have been anthologized by Webber.
and Nilsson (1981) and by Luger (1995). Early papers on neural networks are collected in *Neurocomputing* (Anderson and Rosenfeld, 1988). The *Encyclopedia of AI* (Shapiro, 1992) contains survey articles on almost every topic in AI. These articles usually provide a good entry point into the research literature on each topic.

The most recent work appears in the proceedings of the major AI conferences: the biennial International Joint Conference on AI (IJCAI), the annual European Conference on AI (ECAI), and the National Conference on AI, more often known as AAAI, after its sponsoring organization. The major journals for general AI are *Artificial Intelligence, Computational Intelligence, the IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, IEEE Intelligent Systems*, and the electronic *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*. There are also many conferences and journals devoted to specific areas, which we cover in the appropriate chapters. The main professional societies for AI are the American Association for Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), the ACM Special Interest Group in Artificial Intelligence (SIGART), and the Society for Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB). AAAI’s *AI Magazine* contains many topical and tutorial articles, and its website, aaai.org, contains news and background information.

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**EXERCISES**

These exercises are intended to stimulate discussion, and some might be set as term projects. Alternatively, preliminary attempts can be made now, and these attempts can be reviewed after the completion of the book.

1. **Define in your own words:** (a) intelligence, (b) artificial intelligence, (c) agent.

2. **Read Turing’s original paper on AI** (Turing, 1950). In the paper, he discusses several potential objections to his proposed enterprise and his test for intelligence. Which objections still carry some weight? Are his refutations valid? Can you think of new objections arising from developments since he wrote the paper? In the paper, he predicts that, by the year 2000, a computer will have a 30% chance of passing a five-minute Turing Test with an unskilled interrogator. What chance do you think a computer would have today? In another 50 years?

3. **Every year the Loebner prize is awarded to the program that comes closest to passing a version of the Turing test.** Research and report on the latest winner of the Loebner prize. What techniques does it use? How does it advance the state of the art in AI?

4. **There are well-known classes of problems that are intractably difficult for computers, and other classes that are provably undecidable.** Does this mean that AI is impossible?

5. **Suppose we extend Evans’s ANALOGY program so that it can score 200 on a standard IQ test.** Would we then have a program more intelligent than a human? Explain.

6. **How could introspection—reporting on one’s inner thoughts—be inaccurate?** Could I be wrong about what I’m thinking? Discuss.
1.7 Examine the AI literature to discover whether the following tasks can currently be solved by computers:
   
a. Playing a decent game of table tennis (ping-pong).
b. Driving in the center of Cairo.
c. Buying a week’s worth of groceries at the market.
d. Buying a week’s worth of groceries on the web.
e. Playing a decent game of bridge at a competitive level.
f. Discovering and proving new mathematical theorems.
g. Writing an intentionally funny story.
h. Giving competent legal advice in a specialized area of law.
i. Translating spoken English into spoken Swedish in real time.
j. Performing a complex surgical operation.

For the currently infeasible tasks, try to find out what the difficulties are and predict when, if ever, they will be overcome.

1.8 Some authors have claimed that perception and motor skills are the most important part of intelligence, and that “higher level” capacities are necessarily parasitic—simple add-ons to these underlying facilities. Certainly, most of evolution and a large part of the brain have been devoted to perception and motor skills, whereas AI has found tasks such as game playing and logical inference to be easier, in many ways, than perceiving and acting in the real world. Do you think that AI’s traditional focus on higher-level cognitive abilities is misplaced?

1.9 Why would evolution tend to result in systems that act rationally? What goals are such systems designed to achieve?

1.10 Are reflex actions (such as moving your hand away from a hot stove) rational? Are they intelligent?

1.11 “Surely computers cannot be intelligent—they can do only what their programmers tell them.” Is the latter statement true, and does it imply the former?

1.12 “Surely animals cannot be intelligent—they can do only what their genes tell them.” Is the latter statement true, and does it imply the former?

1.13 “Surely animals, humans, and computers cannot be intelligent—they can do only what their constituent atoms are told to do by the laws of physics.” Is the latter statement true, and does it imply the former?